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The study focuses on national preferences in the supranational EU-Sino trade policy. It examines 
how EU member  states  might  differ  from the  common EU position  and  from each  other.  By 
exploring the approaches of the EU and of member states, it aims to provide some valuable insights 
on the complexity of decision-making in trade policy with China and at the same time contribute to 
the theoretical debate on supranational vs. national policy-making within the EU.
Through analysing official documents and policy statements of the EU and of four member states, 
namely France, Germany, Sweden and Poland, differences in views and approaches on the trade 
policy with China have been identified. A theoretical framework that incorporates both traditional 
and modern trade theory, IPE and rational choice contributes to explaining why preferences in EU-
Sino trade policy are divergent. 
The empirical findings show a difference between the common preference and national preferences. 
Member states prioritise different issues and have diverging positions on the level of openness in 
EU-Sino  trade.  National  preferences  are  driven  by  national  interests.  Trade  intensity  and 
comparative advantages or disadvantages with the trading partner as well as domestic forces are 
influential factors in forming national preferences.
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1. A COMMON PREFERENCE IN TRADE? 
1.1 Introduction 
In the wake of globalisation and a shift in global economic powers, China has become one of the 
largest actors in international trade. In 2010, it  was the European Union's (EU) main source of  
imports and the second destination country after the United States in exports (Eurostat 2011a). EU-
Sino trade has considerable effects on the European economy, so China should be top priority on 
EU's external agenda. Naturally, keeping a healthy bilateral economic relationship with China is 
important for individual member states as well. China's role in international trade is growing while 
the EU's importance as a trading partner for China is  declining (Lindberg et  al.  2012).  A shift 
towards Asia in global economy means that the EU needs to conduct a more efficient and proactive 
external  trade  policy  to  meet  this  challenge (Ahnlid  et  al.  2011  p.413f).  However,  divergent 
approaches of member states have made it difficult for the EU as a common trade bloc to develop a 
coherent and effective trade policy towards the rest of the world (Fox et al. 2009 p.28). With the 
Union's diminishing role as a trade partner for China and its difficulties in conducting an effective 
trade policy in mind, this study focuses on the preferences of the EU and of member states in trade 
policy with China. 
National preferences in EU policy-making differ and EU-Sino trade policy is not an exception. 
Policy-making in external trade is an exclusive competence of the Union at supranational level, 
meaning that member states delegate authority to the EU to legislate in trade policy. The Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) means that individual member states can not legislate on trade matters or 
conclude international trade agreements. Decisions are taken at EU level and cover trade in goods, 
services, foreign direct investment (FDI), commercial aspects of intellectual property and measures 
to protect trade, assuring a uniform level of liberalisation (Art. 207 TFEU). However, member states 
are  also  part  of  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO),  being  represented  by  a  common  EU 
delegation and being members in their own right (WTO 2011a). Therefore, member states can in the  
WTO, albeit the CCP, be addressed and speak for themselves, which contributes to difficulties for 
the EU when keeping a common stance. 
The  Council  of  Ministers  (the  Council  henceforth)  adopt  decisions  by  quality  majority  voting 
(QMV) but delegates power to the European Commission (the Commission henceforth) to represent 
them in trade negotiations (Art. 207 TFEU). As a tool, the Council has at its disposal the  Trade 
policy committee1 (TPC). The TPC formally has a consultative role and constitutes a platform where 
1 Formerly known as the 133 Committee. 
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member states voice their concerns (Štěrbová 2010 p.10). The TPC monitors the Commission and 
transmits information on the preferences of member states to it since the Commission is dependent 
on their proposal being adopted by the Council  (Van Gestel  et al.  2011 p.3). Due to the TPC's 
influence on the Commission, trade policy-making implies a highly political coordination process 
where the Commission must consider diverse preferences of member states. 
Trade is an essential part of the EU's competitiveness and growth strategy. As part of the strategy, 
Global Europe that was adopted in 2006 makes clear that EU's external priority is to continue the 
liberalisation of international trade and to further open up foreign markets (European Commission 
2006b p.2). The WTO remains the most effective way to manage trade in a rules-based system, so 
EU maintains its commitment to multilateralism and further establishment of free trade agreements 
(ibid p.8). Economic openness and non-protectionism is emphasised, where openness and fair rules 
in other markets must be ensured, especially among EU's major trade partners (ibid p.3f). China is 
one  of  those  with  Global  Europe  stating  that  EU must  see  the  country  as  “an opportunity,  a  
challenge and prospective partner” (ibid p.10) The Trade, Growth & World Affairs communication 
from 2010 builds on earlier policies and points out that some of the EU priorities shall be to assure 
access to markets, raw materials and energy, enforce protection of intellectual property rights2 (IPR), 
open public procurement3 and promote international standards (European Commission 2010 p.4). 
Despite  a  common  trade  and  competitiveness  strategy, the lack  of  comprehensive  agreements 
between the  EU and China  demonstrates  the  difficulties  between  member  states  in  reaching a 
common  position  and  interest  in  CCP.  There  is  accordingly  a  lack  of  coherence  in  national 
approaches towards China (Fox et al. 2009 p.2), making it difficult to develop an effective policy in 
the supranational EU-Sino trade. These national approaches can also be convergent yet competitive 
(Brooks 2010 p.59). In the TPC, member states are traditionally divided between two blocs, with 
the liberal camp promoting freer trade while the more protectionist countries prefer a less open 
trade policy (Ahnlid 2007 p.23). 
Hence, in spite of the EU's 'single voice' in trade, not every member state seems to conform to the 
common preference in EU-Sino trade policy. Through analysing the preferences and approaches of 
member states and of the EU, this study aims to examine how national preferences differ from the 
2 IPR can be patents, trade marks, designs, copyrights or geographical indications. 
European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/intellectual-property/ [08-01-2012]
3 Public procurement is the procurement of goods and services on behalf of public authorities. 
European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/public-procurement/  [08-01-2012]
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common position and from each other. Trade policy for China is a particularly interesting case to 
study since China is such a crucial partner for Europe where many member states want to have a 
say, representing both a great challenge and opportunity. How do national preferences diverge on 
EU-Sino trade policy? There is a common position, but is there a common preference? 
1.2 Objective and research questions
The objective of this study is to provide a deeper understanding of national preferences in EU trade 
policy. The focus lies on the CCP vis-à-vis national preferences on trade policy for China. The CCP 
stands for EU's joint policy in EU-Sino trade. National  preferences are defined by the specific 
preference of individual member states on how trade policy on China should be outlined. The study 
attempts to look at if and how national preferences of member states on trade policy for China differ  
from the common policy and from each other. By exploring member states approaches and opinions 
on commercial relations with China, it aims to offer a closer understanding to the complexity of 
EU-Sino trade  policy-making  and  to  contribute  to  the  theoretical  debate  on  supranational  vs. 
national policy-making within the EU. The following questions that are linked to the objective and 
research focus can be identified:
1. What preferences and opinions on trade policy with China exist?
2. Is  there a difference between the EU's common policy preference compared to  national  
preferences on China trade policy? 
3. How do national preferences vary among member states? 
1.3 Scope and limitations 
• National preferences. An analysis covering the preferences of all member states would be 
desirable since such a study would be more complete. Due to necessary restrictions, the 
study will however be limited to the cases of France, Germany, Poland and Sweden. These 
four member states are selected because of their diversity in several factors that might affect 
trade policy preferences. The choice is elaborated further in the methodology chapter. 
• Policy preferences.  Only the explicit  policy output  of  the  EU and the explicit  views of 
member states will be analysed. Because of limitations in time and resources, an analysis of 
the policy-making process is out of scope. This is also discussed more in the methodology 
chapter. 
• The trade  focus.  In  trade  policy,  trade  and investment  are  closely  linked.  Nevertheless, 
CCP's coverage of foreign investment regulation is more limited. This thesis touches upon 
investment issues but mainly focuses on trade.
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
What shapes the EU's economic relations with China? Why might national preferences in trade-
policy making differ? Theory and earlier research contribute to an answer of these questions. 
2.1 The traditional paradigm 
Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage has provided a solid foundation for trade theories ever 
since  1817.  Ricardo  argued  that  countries  will  always  produce  what  they  have  a  comparative 
advantage in producing, countries therefore specialise and export the goods in which they have this 
advantage (Feenstra et al. 2008 p.31). The Specific-factors model builds on this theory and is linked 
to factors of production4(ibid p.64). States trade because the available production resources differ 
across countries. The model assumes that free trade leads to overall gains but when several factors  
of production are involved, some factors will lose (ibid p.91). This is why there are winners and 
losers in trade and explains why some countries are more protectionist than others, seeing as they 
might lose more than they gain from external trade. 
An influential  model in more recent trade theory has been Paul Krugman's work on  New trade 
theory which assumes that consumers prefer a diverse choice of brands and that production favours 
economies  of  scale  (Krugman  1980  p.950ff).  Because  consumers  want  diversity  and  because 
economies of scale are more profitable than spreading the production, countries may concentrate in 
producing several brands of one product instead of specialising in different types of products. New 
economic geography theory further argues that if trade is shaped by economies of scale, regions 
with strong production become more profitable and attract even more production (Krugman et al. 
2009 p.148f). Production therefore tends to concentrate geographically (ibid p.148f). Certain areas 
become more populated and have higher income levels, leading to the creation of economic hubs. 
2.2 Global network theory 
Today, the role of economic hubs has changed. Instead of geographic areas producing a good from 
start to finish, they will contribute to one of the many production stages. Globalisation has led to an 
international fragmentation of the production process which has given rise to global production 
networks (GPN). These networks mean that production processes are fragmented into several stages 
and countries specialise in each production stage according to their comparative advantages (IDE-
JETRO, WTO 2011 p.76). Emerging economies, not least China, have benefited from GPNs which 
4 Factors of production are resources required to generate goods and services such as land, labour and capital (Feenstra  
et al. 2008 p. 62ff). 
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have enabled them to join production stages efficiently (ibid p.76). This modern paradigm in trade 
theory can be labelled as Global network theory. 
In today's post-industrial revolution, 'trade in goods' has been replaced by 'trade in tasks' (ibid p.12). 
It is common that countries specialise in specific stages of production and no longer export finished 
products. This is what global value chains (GVC) represent: a process of steps to obtain finished 
products  where  multiple  geographic  locations  and  companies  are  involved  (ibid  p.12).  Some 
countries are responsible for the parts of the process that add more value than manufacturing such 
as design or marketing, while others are more concerned with tasks linked to the production itself 
(Swedish National Board of Trade 2010 p.6). Supply chains have a high degree of fragmentation 
and incorporate substantial amounts of value added from the countries involved, therefore, products 
marked  'Made  in  China'  are  dependent  on  other  intermediate  goods  (IDE-JETRO,  WTO 2011 
p.74ff).  Trade  in  intermediate  goods  –  parts  used  in  the  production  process  of  a  good  –  has 
increased  significantly.  The  structural  shift  in  how  international  trade  functions  has  led  to  a 
clustering of regional supply chains where 'Factory Asia' makes a fine example (ibid p.7). China 
often assumes the role as assembler, provided with intermediate goods by East Asian suppliers (ibid 
p.87). Products are no longer made in a single country but 'Made in the world' (ibid p.96). 
2.3 International Political Economy 
International Political Economy (IPE) is a discipline where international economy and international 
relations are linked. It assumes a dynamic interaction between the political choices of countries and 
international trade and economy. Balaam and Veseth explain IPE in a simple way by picking apart  
its name, where 'international' means a focus on cross-border issues between and among nation-
states,  'political' stands for the complex involvement  of nation-states,  regional and international 
organisations,  bilateral  and  global  agreements,  and  'economy' deals  with  questions  such  as 
resources, markets, income and wealth (Balaam et al. 2005 p.4f).
IPE analyses the tension between states and markets and between the economic and political results  
of  trade.  Motives  of  states  and  markets  often  differ,  where  “the  outcome  of  markets  reflects  
whatever compromise is  reached between the often-opposing individual interests” while  nation-
states engage in collective action and “reflect the general will and the public interest” (ibid p.15). 
There are three perspectives that scholars of IPE normally obtain. In brief, the liberal perspective is 
most closely associated with economics, the structuralist view with sociology and the mercantilist 
approach with political science and realism (ibid p.22). 
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International trade is highly political and something that all three perspectives of IPE are embedded 
in:  the  global  free  trade  system  (liberalism),  protectionism  to  protect  domestic  markets 
(mercantilism) and the environment around production facilities (structuralism) (ibid p.117ff). Trade 
symbolises both wealth and power and can therefore be used as a tool in foreign policy (ibid p.136). 
Imports  might  threaten  domestic  employment,  cause  external  dependency and reduce  domestic 
monetary reserves, but they might also be crucial for national security since a country might need to 
import specific technology or military equipment (Veseth 2009 p.4f). However, exporting certain 
goods  and  technology  can  also  weaken  national  wealth  and  security  (ibid  p.5).  Thus,  trade 
management can be an important foreign policy tool (ibid p.5), sometimes leading to trade defence 
measures  such as anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguards5. The WTO claims that “countries  
which have experienced strong export growth have lower levels of import protection than countries  
with stagnant or declining exports” (Balaam et al. 2005 p.134).
2.4 Rational choice 
Rational  choice is  a  fundamental  theory of  rationalism and is  developed to explain the  choice 
behaviour of one or several decision-making units (Green 2002 p.4). The decision-makers can be 
consumers and enterprises as well as states and organisations. The theory assumes that choice is 
based  on  preference  and  self-interest  maximisation  where  more  is  preferred  to  less  and  that 
decision-makers do their best to maximise their gains (ibid p.6). Nevertheless, the agent can not 
choose freely among options but is normally restricted by constraints which has made selection 
necessary in the first place (ibid p.7). The agent is predicted to make a choice that is not prohibited 
by constraints but still gives the highest possible value in order to optimise the gains (ibid p.7). 
To conclude, rational choice might explain why countries obtain a certain preference – they act 
rationally  in  order  to  maximise  their  gains.  However,  member  states  must  adapt  to  various 
prerequisites and situations as well. Economic and political  actors at domestic and international 
level,  discussed in  IPE,  and the  conditions of  international  trade,  explained by global  network 
theory, matter. Even though the theoretical approaches presented are all of importance, the study 
will mostly rely on global network theory and IPE arguments.
 
5 Anti-dumping duties are extra taxes imposed on imported products that are considered as being dumped. Anti-
subsidies are countervailing measures, normally in the form of extra taxes imposed on subsidised imports. Safeguards 
are quantitative restrictions in the form of import or tariff quotas. 
European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/trade-defence/   [08-01-2012]
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2.5 Earlier research 
What shapes the external and commercial policy preference of states? Moravcsik has found that an 
interaction of  demand and supply,  of  preference and strategic  opportunities,  shapes  the foreign 
policy  behaviour  of  states  (Moravcsik  1993  p.9).  National  commercial  policy  is  affected  by 
different interest groups seeing that individual producers can be winners or losers of commercial 
liberalisation depending on their competitive position in domestic and international markets (ibid 
p.17,  Lavergne  1983).  Protectionism  reduces  consumer  wealth  in  order  to  protect  domestic 
producers  but  excludes  exporters  from  potential  markets.  Thus,  exporters  tend  to  support 
liberalisation since their profits increase from freer trade while import-competing producers tend to 
oppose it since this undermines their profitability (ibid p.17). Hence, in commercial policy, the level 
of constraint on governments vary according to the intensity and calculability of private interests 
such as trade lobbies (ibid p.8f). Policy preferences of governments are shaped by interest groups 
and domestic forces and decided by cost-benefit calculations.
Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins have identified a North-South conflict line in economic policy-
making when examining coalition formation in EU decision-making (Zimmer et al. 2005 p.413). 
This divide splits member states over matters on subsidies, market regulation and protectionism 
(ibid  p.413).  Usually,  the  South  bloc  more  often  supports  market  regulation  and  protectionist 
measures while the North bloc values free trade and market liberalisation (ibid p.411). A similar 
division  between  two  blocs  in  the  TPC can  be  confirmed.  'Northern  Liberals',  geographically 
centred towards North and West, are more liberal, while 'Club Med', centred in the East and South, 
are more protectionist (Ahnlid 2007 p.23). Sweden is part of 'Northern Liberals' and Germany also 
belongs to the liberal camp with the exception of questions concerning agricultural policy, whereas 
France is a leader of 'Club Med' in which Poland also represents one of the more protectionist  
member states (ibid p.23ffff).  Fox and Godement see Sweden as liberal in trade with China while 
Poland, France and to some extent Germany are viewed as more protectionist (Fox et al. 2009 p.4). 
Germany mostly has a liberal  attitude  but can support protectionist  measures if  the sectors are 
specifically important for the its economic and consumer interests (Zimmer et al. 2005 p. 412).
Koenig-Archibugi argues that power capabilities are important for how much governments conform 
to the EU preference when choosing institutional rules (Koenig-Archibugi 2004 p.143). On power 
capabilities, Tallberg has also found that bargaining power in the Council increases with a member 
state's  structural  powers  such as  economic  strength and population  size  (Tallberg  2008 p.687). 
Power capacities can therefore also play a role in shaping policy preferences. 
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3. METHODOLOGY
This comparative study will  be conducted through qualitative text analysis. Step one will  be to 
collect empirical findings from documents, identifying the preferences and opinions on China trade 
policy that exist. Step two will be to analyse the preferences through carrying out comparisons at 
multiple levels, answering to whether there is a difference in policy preferences and if so, how 
preferences vary. The analysis scheme, presented later in this chapter, will look at the opinions on 
China as an economic partner on a more general and specific level. On a more specific level, the 
study analyses the national priorities on the trade agenda. How open trade with China should be and 
how liberal or protectionist the taken stance in trade policy with China is will also be looked at.
3.1 Choice of member states  
The study will focus on four countries: France, Germany, Poland and Sweden. The choice is made 
in order to gain variation in factors that studies have shown matter in policy-making. It varies with 
regard  to  the  North-South  dimension,  the  liberal-protectionist  view,  the  structural  power  factor 
linked to economic strength and in trade intensity. 
According to the North-South division, 'North' represents a liberal stance in trade policy and 'South' 
a more restrictive one (Zimmer et al. 2005 p.413). Germany and Sweden are in this context defined 
as 'North' and France and Poland as 'South'. Anders Ahnlid, former Director of trade at the Swedish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and chief Swedish representative of the TPC, confirms this (Ahnlid 
2007 p.23ffff)6. Germany and Sweden belong to the liberals in commercial policy while France and 
Poland  are  seen  as  more  protectionist  (ibid).  France  and  Poland  will  thus  be  classified  as 
protectionist and Sweden as liberal in trade. On Germany, research has shown that it can take a 
more protectionist stance in some specific sectors (Zimmer et al. 2005 p. 412). Still, since Germany 
in most cases is part of the liberal camp in trade it will be classified as a liberal. 
Power capabilities can also be an important factor in policy preference (Koenig-Archibugi 2004 
p.143, Tallberg 2008 p.687). Since this study focuses on trade policy, it seems justified to interpret 
power capability as economic strength. Economic strength will be determined through the size of 
the economy, decided by annual GDP in market prices of the countries. Each member state's GDP 
has been put in relation to the GDP of the EU27 average. If a member state's GDP is higher than the 
average, the country is classified as a larger economy and if it turns out lower, then as a smaller  
economy. From the data, France and Germany turn out to be larger and Sweden and Poland smaller 
6 Personal interview, 29-11-2011
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than the EU average7. 
Table 3.1 Classification of member states. 
France  Germany Poland Sweden 
North-South South North South North
Liberal-protectionist Protectionist Liberal Protectionist Liberal 
Size of economy Larger than 
EU average 
Larger than 
EU average 
Smaller than 
EU average 
Smaller than 
EU average 
Source: Author's own elaboration.
According to IPE, trade management is linked to a country's foreign policy. How vital exports and 
imports are – trade intensity of a country – might shape economic priorities on the domestic and 
external agenda. Trade intensity is here defined by share of trade in goods and services in relation to 
GDP. Adding the trade to GDP ratio constitutes an extra relevant diversity factor. Table 3.2 below 
shows trade intensity in both exports and imports for the concerned countries, including the lowest 
and highest ratios of the EU. The range points out how trade intensity varies in the EU and makes it  
easier to see where the four member states are positioned on a 'trade intensity scale'. The selected 
countries vary in share of trade to GDP. Germany is the biggest exporter in goods but trade in goods 
are likewise important for the Polish and Swedish economy. Sweden is clearly the biggest exporter 
and importer of services in relative terms. France has the lowest trade intensity of the four. They do 
not represent any extreme cases which is positive in order to assure a representativeness of  EU as a  
whole, however, trade intensity differs much enough to obtain diversity in the choice.
Table 3.2 Trade intensity for Intra-EU trade in 2009. Share of GDP in percent. 
France Germany Poland Sweden Lowest of EU27 Highest of EU27 
Exports  
goods
17,8 34,2 32,3 32,7 6,6
(Greece) 
63,2 
(Hungary)
Exports  
services
 5,4 6,9 6,7 15 4,8 
(Italy)
116,5
(Luxembourg)
Imports  
goods
20,2 28,6 33,3 29,5 19,1
(Italy)
60,8
(Slovakia)
Imports  
services
4,8 7,6 5,6 11,4 4,8
(France)
68,6
(Luxembourg)
Source:  Eurostat 2011c p.418
With China specifically, Germany, France and Sweden are among the larger traders while Poland is
7 GDP at market prices, in millions of euro, 2010: EU27 total = 11,981,916. EU average = 443,775.
  France = 1,917,190. Germany = 2,462,100. Poland = 322,661. Sweden = 307,691. (Eurostat 2011d)
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smaller but still among the top EU importers of Chinese goods8. Except the fact that the countries 
demonstrate diversity in several factors, the choice can be further motivated by the fact that they are 
all more or less relevant players in EU-Sino trade, striking a balance between factor variation and 
being relevant players. France and Germany are leaders in EU-Sino relations (Fox et al. 2009 p.9). 
The fact that they contrast each other in attitude on trade policy-making makes them even more 
interesting to study. Sweden and Poland,  two smaller nations and also antagonists  in  the 'trade 
blocs', are included to balance the 'big powers'. Former Swedish TPC representative Anders Ahnlid 
also confirms that these four countries represent relevant differences in trade policy preference9. 
A choice always means limitations. The selection strives for variation in several factors so that the 
countries can be somewhat representative for the EU as a whole.  A limited number of member 
states is analysed so it is questionable how general the conclusions drawn will be. However, the aim 
of the study is to obtain a deeper understanding on how national preferences differ, demonstrating 
the diversity that exist in attitude, rather than calculate to what degree one country is more liberal 
than another, something that would require a study with a more quantitative approach. 
3.2 Material 
On the choice of material, it is relevant to note that this study focuses on the policy output and not 
the policy process of actors. Internal debates of the TPC, the Commission or national governments 
are not the focal point. The focus in EU's case lies on the common position that legislative actors 
have agreed upon, in the case of member states how they approach trade policy with China from 
their national perspective. Political pre-debates in policy-making itself will not be analysed, instead 
it is the outcome of such a discussion, the explicit and official view that will be covered. 
A study focusing on the process would certainly be interesting, yet hard to execute since much of 
the policy-making process is non-transparent. For example, meeting minutes from the TPC, where 
most of the political coordination is being done are not public material. One interview with Anders 
Ahnlid has been made with regard to the position and preferences of different member states in the 
TPC. The interview was aimed at discussing the selection of member states only and is not part of 
the  analysis  material  itself.  Interviews  with  officials  from the  concerned  member  states  could 
provide necessary material for the analysis but such a study would require more time and resources. 
A study that includes the policy process is thus out of scope.
8 Largest EU exporters to China 2010: 1. Germany 2. France 7. Sweden 13. Poland
  Largest EU importers from China 2010: 1. Germany 5. France 8. Poland 11. Sweden (Eurostat 2011a) 
9 Personal interview, 29-11-2011
10
The material for the analysis will be official policies and statements of member states. This means a 
formal tone in the texts, providing the official side of the story. It is the explicitly expressed views 
and preferences that will  be compared with each other.  Documents are  mainly provided by the 
concerned governments  and institutions.  Country strategies, policy papers,  relevant  government 
newsletters and official reports are types of texts that will be considered. 
With regard to the EU's exclusive competence, member states do not need to outline precise policy 
strategies on trade with China, since this is being done by the Commission. Comparable documents 
might thus be hard to find. Therefore, speeches and statements by relevant officials will also be 
consulted to avoid a lack in material. A weakness with analysing speeches is that preferences might 
be less consistent and shift,  depending on the specific  government constellation.  Therefore,  the 
study  is  limited  to  including  texts  and statements  from the  two  latest  government/commission 
formations only (including the one in office), assuring enough text material, yet opinions and views 
that are up to date. The oldest documents are dated in 2006.
Information on external cooperation with China is not always accessible. The amount of documents 
published and available in English vary. The case of the EU and Sweden is unproblematic. For 
France,  material  is  accessible  but  often  published  in  French.  Relevant  quotations  have  been 
translated to English by the author without excluding the original French version. German material 
are in terms of language and publications available more limited, however, the government website 
has a 'China portal' with much relevant information. Poland is less accessible in these terms as well.  
Here, official newsletters and policy reports have been incorporated.
3.3 Trade data 
Data  on  EU-Sino  trade  patterns  are  collected  from  Eurostat,  the  EU's  statistical  office.  It  is 
important to remember that trade data can give a simplified picture of a complex reality. Statistics 
show a huge economic imbalance in EU-Sino trade. Nevertheless, this can be a misleading picture 
of today's interconnected production networks. A study on shoes has found that the EU has 60-80% 
of value added in shoes manufactured and 'Made in China' (Swedish National Board of Trade 2010 
p.10). In many cases, Chinese imports have meant European exports in the first place. A large part  
of  the  value  added  of  products  made  in  China  accrues  to  European  companies  (European 
Commission  2006a p.6). Trade statistics only show the transaction value of goods. They do not 
take into account the value added from other steps of the GPN such as design, marketing, research, 
logistics, global management etc. 
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Furthermore, differences in data collection and national methodology lead to asymmetry in trade 
statistics (HMRC 2009 p.3). Differences in what the EU records as arrivals from China and what 
China records as dispatches to the EU causes asymmetry in data (ibid p.4). Goods may be allocated 
to the wrong partner country because they are in transit from one country to another (ibid p.8).  
China's reported imports from the EU can be asymmetrical to EU's reported exports to China. Re-
exports  through  Hong  Kong,  an  essential  import  hub  for  European  exports,  are  one  of  the 
explanations for data discrepancy (Ferrantino et al 2007 p.2). When the goods were exported they 
did not  represent  exports  to  mainland China.  After  having received them from Hong Kong,  in 
Chinese  data,  they might  still  represent  European imports.  This  leads  to  an underestimation  of 
European exports to China causing a trade imbalance that seems bigger for the EU than for China. 
The deficit is also significantly bigger for European import hubs such as the UK or the Netherlands. 
As transit countries of goods for Intra-EU trade, their data show a large amount of Chinese imports. 
When Chinese goods are re-dispatched to other countries they may now be allocated to the UK or  
the Netherlands instead (HMRC 2009 p.8). Different systems will affect data and lead to asymmetry  
in statistics. Data might look different depending on from whose perspective you look.
3.4 Analytical instrument
The analysis  scheme presented  in  table  3.3 below will  be  used  when comparing  opinions  and 
preferences, providing an overview of how they differ in trade policy with China.
Table 3.3 Analysis scheme.
Questions EU France Germany Poland Sweden 
Is China a prioritised economic partner? 
What is the opinion on China's role in  
international trade and economy?
What are the economic goals in trade with  
China? 
What issues are on the agenda in trade with  
China?
What is the preference on openness in trade  
with China? 
What should be the main tool used in foreign  
trade policy with China? 
The first three questions give a more general picture of the bilateral economic relationship. Through 
them we might identify if general opinions on China as a partner and global player are divergent 
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and what the economic goals are. The following three questions touch more specific themes. They 
focus on which issues the analysed units prioritise and the preference of openness in trade. It is 
unproblematic to compare the issues raised by looking at which questions are brought forward. On 
the  preference  of  openness,  this  is  more  complicated  since  some  sort  of  estimation  and 
interpretation must be made. The analytical instrument will not be able to point out precisely how 
much  more  liberal  a  country  is  compared  to  another  since  it  is  based  on  qualitative  method. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible to estimate the preference through comparing how much openness 
and free trade is emphasised. For example, if the Commission and country A regularly declare that 
“open trade is  crucial” and country B does not,   preferences of country A and the EU will  be 
interpreted as more liberal in trade than for country B. The last question regarding what tools that 
should be used in trade policy can also give important indications. If the Commission states that 
“we oppose the use of protectionist measures” and country A does not, this points towards a more 
protectionist stance in the case of country A than for the common EU position. 
3.5 Validity 
The aim is to look at what attitudes and approaches in EU-Sino trade policy that exist and how they 
might differ. Bearing in mind the limitations in time and resources, a qualitative analysis of policy 
texts and statements is a reasonable method to use. Analysing the official preference is a suitable 
operationalisation of the research question since it is the policy output and not the policy process 
that is  in  focus. If  the actual  process was the focus,  the study would be less valid since other 
methods and material would be more suitable to answer the questions presented.  
 
The study proceeds from the same starting point for all the analysed units, with material provided 
by  institutions  and  governments,  representing  the  official  preferences.  A  few  different,  yet 
comparable, types of texts will be applied on each unit. Multiple types of texts give a more accurate 
picture  of  the  preferences  and  diminish  the  risk  of  one  document  misleading  the  conclusions. 
Consistency and limitation regarding the time-aspect also assures that the findings are comparable 
and up to date. Moreover, the same analytical instrument is applied on all the analysed units. The 
risk of misinterpreting the contents of the texts due to language barriers is deemed as low since the 
author  is  fluent  in  all  the  concerned languages  (English,  Swedish and French).  Consistency in 
methodology,  sources,  material,  time  and  execution  of  the  analysis  will  thus  assure  the  thesis 
reliability and give the empirical results validity. 
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4. TRADE PATTERNS AND PREFERENCES  
This chapter gives an empirical background. It explores the EU-Sino trade pattern and highlights 
the known issues and preferences in trade policy with China. It also presents the empirical findings 
from the analysis.
4.1 Empirical Background 
4.1.1 EU-Sino trade patterns 
China was EU's largest importer in 2010 covering 19% of the total extra-EU imports and the second 
biggest destination country representing 8% of the total EU exports (Eurostat 2011b). EU is China's 
main trading partner covering 17 % of its trade (ibid). In 2010, EU's imports from China were worth 
282,531 million euro while exports to China only reached a value of 113,272 million euro, as the 
tables 4.1 and 4.2 show (Eurostat 2011a). Germany, France, Italy, UK and the Netherlands are top 
five in both exports and imports in trade with China (Eurostat 2011a). EU mostly exports high-
value and high-tech products (European Commission 2006b p.4). Imports from China are often 
more low value-added and low labour-intensive although they are moving up the value chain. 
Table 4.1 Imports from China in 2010. Millions of euro. 
Source: Eurostat 2011a
Table 4.2 Exports to China in 2010. Millions of euro. 
Source: Eurostat 2011a
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The tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that Germany is clearly the biggest exporter, representing about half of 
EU's total exports. All countries have a negative trade balance importing more than they export. 
One must bear in mind that data can be misleading and give a one-sided picture. As discussed in the 
methodology  chapter,  data  do  not  take  into  account  European  value  added  in  Chinese  goods. 
Different ways of counting can also lead to discrepancies. The trade imbalance therefore seems 
bigger than what it is for certain countries. Still, this gives some countries stronger motivations to 
prioritise trade relations with China due to higher trade intensity or bigger deficits. 
EU-Sino trade is imbalanced with China obtaining a large trade surplus.  The Chinese has set up 
many more obstacles for European businesses to enter the Chinese market than the EU has for 
China which has lead to a big trade deficit for Europe (Fox et al. 2009 p.2). Economic imbalance is 
one of the major causes for divisions among member states, explaining EU's demand for a more 
open Chinese market which for European firms today can mean special standards, unfavourable 
regulations and opaque processes  (ibid p.45f).  In  several  areas  where  European enterprises are 
competitive, market access problems exist (Dreyer et al. 2008 p.3). Increased access to market and 
public procurement, to the service and financial  sector and enforcement of IPR have long been 
issues for member states in China trade policy (Fox et al. 2009 p.53). 
China, on the other hand, demands Market Economy Status (MES)10 from the EU and wants stricter 
discipline  on  the  union's  use  of  trade  defence,  being  its  main  target  in  antidumping measures  
(Dreyer et al. 2008 p.3). Without MES, it is easier for Chinese firms to be found guilty of dumping 
goods on European markets  which  can lead to  anti-dumping or  anti-subsidies,  hurting Chinese 
exports (Green 2004 p.1). In China's WTO accession agreement, the EU has agreed to grant them 
MES in 2015 but will not grant China this status earlier since the union believes that several criteria 
are not fulfilled (ibid p.2f). However, this is a good example of an issue where member states differ. 
In crisis-hit Europe, China's presence has expanded and this makes it  even harder to develop a 
united and effective China strategy (Godement et al.  2011 p.1). China is becoming an essential 
financial,  investment  and public  provider,  which  “leaves  the  Europeans  with  little  leverage  to  
improve  their  own  access  to  these  very  same  sectors  in  China,  which  are  mostly  closed  or  
controlled” (ibid p.2). The cleavage between member states who are frustrated over market access 
and those who put Chinese deals and investment in front is deepening (ibid p.7). Market access is 
10 MES matters, for example, in the context of trade defence investigations, affecting the method for calculating anti-  
dumping duties (Green 2004 p.3). 
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becoming  even more  pressing  for  free-traders  since  they  want  business  opportunities  for  their 
companies. Germany, France and the UK are moving closer towards this group (ibid p.8). Others 
are  in  need of  Chinese  investment  and business  deals  and have  become less  assertive  in  their 
political stance (ibid p.7). Fragmentation of the EU-China policy has intensified. 
4.1.2 Known issues and preferences 
Earlier  studies  have  indicated  a  variety  of  preferences  concerning  openness  in  trade  and trade 
protectionism. The EU has opposed protectionism. The Commission takes a liberal stance and has 
been supported by other free-traders  of the union. However,  the traditionally free-trade spirited 
rhetoric that previous trade commissioner Peter Mandelson was known for, shifted and became 
more restrictive in 2008 (Dreyer et al. 2009 p.7f). Trade imbalance and the exchange rate of the 
yuan  were  among the  issues  that  caused  frustration  and lead  to  an  increased  support  in  using 
antidumping tariffs (ibid p.1). Market access and the protection of  intellectual property have also 
long been pressing issues (ibid p.14). The Commission has always safeguarded EU policy against 
protectionism  but  has  lately  made  a  move  away  from  the  liberal-minded  group  in  rhetorics, 
affecting the internal balance between the two blocs in commercial policy making (ibid p.8).
Germany is the only member state with a more balanced trade with China and has the strongest  
bilateral  trade  relationship. The  Germans  support  openness  since  trade  is  fundamental  to  their 
economy but can lean towards protectionism in some specific sectors. Former chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder was supportive in politics and liberal in trade policy with China (Fox et al. 2009 p.23f). 
Under  Angela  Merkel's  previous  and  current  cabinet  though,  Germany  has  more  often  been 
positioned in between the protectionist and liberal camp and has become more critical in political 
attitude (Fox et al. 2009 p.4f). Media and public opinion is quite critical on political and economic 
issues with China (ibid p.68). Germany has not been afraid to stand up to China on unfair trade 
matters and to support protective trade measures when it sees them as justified (ibid p.24). Germany 
is competitive in advanced industrial sectors (ibid p.69).
Polish trade and investment have mainly been centred in Europe with the EU representing two-
thirds of  Polish trade (Sikorski  2011 p.4).  Bilateral  economic relations with China are limited. 
Poland's strategy towards China has been pragmatic and underlined the necessity of acting together 
with European countries in order to obtain more influence in trade policy matters (Palonka 2010 
p.375).  Poland is seen as on the critical side when it comes to politics and more protectionist in 
trade, and has like Germany been ready to stand up to China on unfair trade issues and to support  
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protective measures (Fox et al. 2009 p.24). Poland has few markets and sectors that can compete 
with Chinese enterprises so they are less dependent on Chinese 'good-will' and on keeping China 
satisfied (ibid p.24). They are not as concerned about market access or IPR as more high-tech based 
economies albeit there is a fear to lose investment from old member states to China (ibid p.70). The 
global recession has affected the national approach somewhat with Poland becoming less assertive 
on political issues to attract Chinese deals and investment (Godement et al. 2011 p.7). The bilateral 
relation was recently extended to a level of strategic partnership (Chinese Embassy in Poland 2011). 
China has high priority on France's foreign policy agenda. France is China's 4th biggest importer but 
the trade relationship is unbalanced where France's deficit with China has widened during the last  
few years (Fox et al. 2009 p.81f). The French are well-known for their brands and luxury goods. 
Unsurprisingly, the protection of intellectual property has been a focus in commercial policy with 
China (ibid p.82). France has been on the protectionist side under the lead of both Jacques Chirac 
and Nicolas Sarkozy but the political attitude has shifted to become more critical with Sarkozy (ibid 
p.4). Under Sarkozy's presidency, the Chinese have been provoked by France on issues such as 
Tibet and human rights which have destabilised bilateral relations. However, it is still one of the 
most  powerful  countries  in  Europe  so  France  as  a  partner  can  not  be  ignored.  Together  with 
Germany and the UK, France is competing to be China's preferred partner in Europe (ibid p.28). 
China  is  Sweden's  10th largest  trading  partner  (ibid  p.75).  Swedish  companies  have  a  strong 
commercial presence and have invested considerable amounts of FDI in China (Swedish National 
Board of Trade 2008 p.15). Being one of the strongest opposers to trade defence,  Sweden is a 
liberalist in trade and more on the critical side in political attitude (Fox et al. 2009 p.25). Its high 
technology and service based economy benefit rather than is threatened by Chinese imports (ibid 
p.6). Swedish value-added in services, design, knowledge and R&D makes IPR a frequent issue in 
economic  discussions.  For  Sweden,  there  is  clear  link  between  trade,  development  and  the 
environment (Björling 2011 p.1). Priorities in the economic relationship have thus been climate 
change  and  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  (CSR)11,  with  the  government  promoting 
environmentally friendly and sustainable policies, making use of Sweden's competitive advantage 
in green technology. 
11 CSR stands for sustainable and responsible business practices. European Commission: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/index_en.htm [08-01-2012]
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4.2 Empirical Findings 
4.2.1 EU
Is China a prioritised economic partner? 
China is top priority on EU's agenda. This is clearly demonstrated in Global Europe, where China is 
one of the main points in external priorities (European Commission 2006b p.10). Karel de Gucht, 
Commissioner in trade, said that China in many ways define “the economic age we live in, and it is  
extremely important that our understanding of the business relationship with China is well-founded  
and nuanced.” (De Gucht 2011b p.2) “Out trade policy needs to pay particular attention to the US,  
China,  Russia,  Japan,  India  and  Brazil”  declares  the  Commission's  trade  strategy  (European 
Commission 2010 p.10) China is one of the most prioritised trading partners due to its economic 
size and influence in global economy (ibid p.11). 
What is the opinion on China's role in international trade and economy? 
EU welcomes China's growth and seeks to benefit from it through open trade. “China is the single  
greatest test of Europe's capacity to make globalisation an opportunity for jobs and growth. /.../  
Europe must get China right, as an opportunity, a challenge and a prospective partner.” (European 
Commission 2006b p.10) China is a great opportunity for Europe but also a challenging competitor 
internationally. On the international arena, “China is having to increasingly recognise and respect  
not only the legal responsibilities it now faces as a member of a global rules-based body, but also  
the  WTO 'spirit'  of  promoting  open  markets  and non-discriminatory  principles  in  its  domestic  
legislation,  and the enforcement  of  it” (European Commission 2011) de Gucht  said on the 10th 
anniversary of China's WTO accession.  EU wants China to take the lead in promoting open trade 
and in ensuring fair competition on the global market. EU's China Strategy paper similarly points 
out that “China's significance in international trade is now such that the country must demonstrate  
its ability to ensure competition on a fair and equitable basis, commensurate with its weight as a  
trading nation” (European External Action Service 2007 p.5). 
What are the economic goals in trade with China?
EU's trade policy is “building on commitment to an open, fair and rules-based trading system” 
(European Commission 2010 p.2), constituting the basis for the economic relationship with China. 
“The  EU-China  trade  relationship  generates  significant  benefits  for  both  partners”  and  this 
relationship should be maintained (De Gucht 2011a p.2). EU wants to increase European exports to 
the Chinese market and the competitiveness of European goods and services. “Given its tremendous 
growth potential, China is a major attraction for exports and investment” (European Commission 
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2010 p.5).  EU-Sino trade remains below potential  and the EU wants to intensify trade,  market 
access barriers in China must therefore be dealt with (ibid p.11).
  
What issues are on the agenda in trade with China?
Market access: One of the most pressing issues is to create a level playing field in EU-Sino trade 
(De Gucht 2011b p.2f). Important sectors currently remain closed for foreign investment and it is 
hard for foreign companies to win contracts due to the Chinese public procurement and investment 
regulation (ibid p.2f). To create fairer competition, market access for European companies must be 
improved. Accessing the Chinese market is a question of openness in trade. China should meet the 
WTO obligations  and continue  “to  liberalise  access  to  goods,  services,  investment  and public  
procurement markets” (European Commission 2006a p.3).
Market Economy Status (MES): Chinese has since long been lobbying for the EU to grant them 
MES in anti-dumping investigations so this is not a new debate. “The EU is actively working with  
China with a view to creating the conditions permitting an early  granting of MES” (ibid p.13). 
China is currently not fulfilling the conditions and opinions among member states remain divided 
on how soon the EU should grant MES.  
Trade balance:  EU's trade deficit  is  an important  issue and is  linked to the accessibility of the 
Chinese market. Nevertheless, trade data can be misleading. European exports in general has not 
decreased. “The trade deficit with China hides to some extent the fact that its exports have partly  
replaced exports from other Asian countries” (ibid p.8). Still, dealing with the deficit to get a more 
balanced trade is essential.  To achieve this “a range of  obstacles to market access and skewed  
conditions of competition need urgent attention” (ibid p.8).
IPR:  China is now EU's first priority for intellectual property enforcement worldwide (ibid p.12). 
China's IPR implementation and compliance with the WTO commitments is crucial. Since it is in 
innovation, design and high-value production the EU has comparative advantage, protection of IPR 
is a pressing issue (ibid p.10). Counterfeiting, forced technology transfers and weak enforcement of 
IPR equal a loss in money and in competitiveness for EU exporters. 
Public Procurement: Public procurement is a sector in which EU industry is very competitive, but 
also  the  area  where  foreign  markets  are  particularly  closed  for  EU  companies  (European 
Commission 2010 p.6). EU is continuing its demand to open up public procurement abroad and is 
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“pushing for early Chinese accession to the GPA” (ibid, p.6). Recent progress in this field has been 
made  when  a  new  accord  on  the  WTO's  Agreement  on  Government  Procurement  (GPA)  was 
reached in December 2011 (WTO 2011b). However, mainland China has not accessed to the GPA 
(ibid).
What is the preference of openness in trade with China? 
A cornerstone in EU's trade policy is promoting open trade since it stimulates economic growth, 
jobs and benefits consumers (European Commission 2010 p.5) Openness is the key in trade and the 
EU should continue to offer China open and fair market access (European Commission 2006a p.3). 
It is the opening-up of markets that will lead to mutual gains. “Europe seeks reciprocity from China  
in a trade partnership of equals” (ibid p.15). Openness should thus be reciprocal. China must also 
make an effort and open up its market to European exporters. However, Europe must lead the way 
since “it cannot call for openness from China from behind walls of its own” (ibid p.11).
What should be the main tool in foreign trade policy with China?
When  defending  Europe's  interests  in  trade  disputes,  the  Commission  places  dialogue  and 
negotiation first (ibid p.13). Sectoral dialogues in different policy areas provide a solid foundation 
for policy coordination on trade and other economic issues in EU-Sino relations (European External 
Action  Service  2011).  EU's  High  Level  Economic  and  Trade  Dialogue  with  China  is  also  an 
essential  tool  for  addressing  imbalances  in  the  trade  relationship  (European  Commission  2010 
p.11).  If negotiation and dialogue fail, the EU will consult the multilateral WTO regulations and 
consider trade defence. Trade defence instruments should only be used when justified and always as 
the second solution.“Trade defence measures will remain an instrument to ensure fair conditions of  
trade  between China and the  EU, as  with other countries.  The EU will  use  these  instruments  
carefully but rigorously where they are justified.” (European Commission 2006a p.13).
 
4.2.2 France 
Is China a prioritised economic partner? 
France  and China  has  since  2004 shared a  strategic  global  partnership dialogue on global  and 
bilateral issues, focusing on the structural partnership in industry and economy and on political and 
security  questions  (French  Ministry  for  Foreign  and  European  Affairs  2010  p.3).  China  is  a 
prioritised partner both in political and economic relations. Former French trade minister Christine 
Lagarde declared that “China is for us a commercial partner of first level priority”12 (Lagarde 2007 
12 Original quote: “la Chine est pour nous un partenaire commercial de premier plan”
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p.2). Sarkozy said that the reason why he visits China so often is because France must be where the 
heart of the 21th century is, which is China (Sarkozy 2011 p.3). 
What is the opinion on China's role in international trade and economy? 
Sarkozy has said that China plays an essential role in global economy and that France is not afraid 
of its development (Sarkozy 2007 p.1).“France understands that China has a major role to play for  
global stability”13(ibid p.5). As a powerful actor and an economic giant, China has rights as well as 
responsibilities  and  obligations  (ibid  p.1).  The  prime  minister,  Francois  Fillon,  has  likewise 
emphasised the responsibilities that China must now take (Fillon 2009 p.2). China shall  play a 
central  role  in  global  economy  and  Sarkozy  emphasises  that  the  French  are  “not  afraid”  and 
welcome China's development. Still,  Lagarde points out that “If China is a partner, it  is also a  
competitor.  This  means  respecting  China  as  well  as  considering  it  as  a  serious  economic  
competitor”14 (Lagarde 2007 p.3). China is thus seen as a serious competitor to the French economy. 
What are the economic goals in trade with China?
There  is  economic  cooperation  in  many  fields  with  China  and France  wants  to  strengthen the 
relation and expand cooperation further. An important premise of the economic relationship is that 
China respects the rules of global trade, increases its efforts in protecting IPR, in product safety and 
in economic governance (Sarkozy 2007 p.3). “A word that is especially important to me, is the word  
reciprocity. I wish for a relationship that is mutually beneficial”15 Sarkozy has said on the topic of 
trade and market access (ibid p.3). For France, an important foundation in the economic relation is 
reciprocity. Furthermore,  balance in trade and in economic cooperation must be reached (Juppé 
2011 p.2). An important step to rectify the balance and achieve reciprocity is decreasing France's 
deficit with China (French Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs 2010 p.20)
What issues are on the agenda in trade with China?
Trade balance: China has one France's biggest bilateral deficits in trade and is therefore a recurring 
issue. Foreign affairs minister Alain Juppé has said that “we want more reciprocity, since there is no 
sustainable economic and trade relationship if it's not based on mutual benefits and balance”16 
13 Original quote: “La France comprend qu'elle (la Chine) a un rôle majeur dans la stabilité du monde”
14 Original quote: “Si la Chine est un partenaire, c'est aussi un concurrent. C'est respecter la Chine que de la  
considérer comme un  sérieux concurrent économique”
15 Original quote: “un mot qui me tient particulièrement à coeur, qui est le mot réciprocité. Je souhaite des relations  
mutuellement bénéfiques”
16 Original quote: “Nous voulons plus de réciprocité, car il n’y a pas de relation économique et commerciale durable si  
elle n’est pas construite sur des bénéfices mutuels et sur une relation équilibrée.”
21
(Juppé 2011 p.2). Balance is indeed emphasised. The premier Fillon said that a better balance must 
be created in the trade relationship and investment developed in both directions (Fillon 2009 p.2). 
Improved market access for foreign investments is part of the solution. France also wants increased 
operation by French companies in China to diminish the deficit (Lagarde 2007 p.2). 
IPR: The IPR question is often raised. “I know that China, where IPR of our companies are not  
always  respected,  deploys  important  measures  to  fight  this.  We  are  waiting  for  results.”  said 
Lagarde and claims that protection of intellectual property is in the interest of both economies 17 
(Lagarde 2007 p.3). 
Currency exchange rate: The yuan exchange rate contributes to the economic imbalance, where the 
yuan continues to depreciate against the euro, creating an artificial advantage for Chinese exports 
(ibid p.3). Sarkozy declared that “France is not afraid of China's development. France understands  
that  she  (China)  plays  a  major  role  for  global  stability,  but  France  wants  China  to  take  full  
responsibility in the regulation of the big international questions: the yuan, the rules for a level  
playing field, the reciprocity”18(Sarkozy 2007 p.5). Hence the issue must be dealt with in order to 
create a level playing field for both parts. 
What is the preference of openness in trade with China? 
As mentioned already, reciprocity is a fundamental for France in trade with China. France wants  
openness in trade but demands the same from China in order to create a level playing field. France 
and Europe can not choose to be closed because if they do, they will only be met by closure back  
(Sarkozy 2007 p.4).  Hence,  France  supports  openness  but  this  is  not  without  conditions.  They 
expect China to be open in return and are not afraid to demand this from the Chinese. The trade 
relationship must be based on mutual give-and-take. Gains also means costs, Europe must be open 
but so must China. Their preference in openness is more implicitly shown through the straight-
forward  demands  on  reciprocity  in  trade  policy,  pointing  to  the  fact  that  they  hold  a  more 
protectionist view in trade. 
What should be the main tool in foreign trade policy with Ch  ina? 
Dialogue is an important tool which the strategic partnership dialogue illustrates. Mutual benefits 
17 Original quote: “Je sais que la Chine, où les droits de propriété intellectuelle de nos entreprises ne sont pas toujours  
bien respectés, déploie des moyens importants pour lutter contre ce fléau. Nous attendons des résultats.”
18 Original quote: “La France n'a pas peur du développement de la Chine. La France comprend qu'elle a un rôle  
majeur dans la stabilité du monde, mais la France veut que la Chine prenne toute sa part du règlement des grandes  
questions du monde : le yuan, les règles équitables, la réciprocité”
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will be gained through cooperation and dialogue (ibid p.3). The EU also plays an important role in 
trade  policy  questions  (ibid  p.3).  “The  EU-Sino  relationship  is  in  this  respect  an  essential  
complement to the Paris-Beijing relationship and an important element in France's China policy”19 
(French Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs 2010 p.22). Although France is a big economic 
power in Europe, EU is still emphasised as a vital tool in external trade with China. It is difficult to  
find an explicit French statement on the use of trade defence. However, France is known to belong 
to the protectionist bloc in the EU and to be one of the member states with a more demanding 
rhetoric  towards  China (Dreyer  et  al.  2008 p.7).  The demands on reciprocity also confirm this 
stance. 
4.2.3 Germany 
Is China a prioritised economic partner? 
China  is  “the  rising  star  of  the  past  two decades”  so it  is  necessary  to  further  strengthen the 
partnership with China according to foreign minister Guido Westerwelle (Foreign Federal Office 
2011a). Germany and China are conducting annual intergovernmental consultations, the first of its 
kind that China  has  with an EU member state.  Cooperation  on political  issues is  strong and a 
prerequisite for dialogue on sensitive issues is  that China and Germany have closely integrated 
economies (Glos 2006 p.2). “Germany is China’s most important trading partner in the EU. And  
China is Germany’s most important trading partner in Asia.” (Westerwelle 2010 p.2). 
What is the opinion on China's role in international trade and economy? 
As  an  economic  heavyweight,  China  shares  responsibility  to  the  global  economy  as  a  whole 
(Westerwelle 2010 p.3). Germany welcomes China's increasingly important role on the international 
arena  and  believes  that  China  must  become  more  integrated  in  global  structures  to  become  a 
“responsible stakeholder” (CDU/CSU 2007 p.15).  “The up-and-coming Asian economies must be  
urged to adhere right away to the rules of the international system to which they owe their rise./.../If  
they  are  ready  to  do  so,  we  will  do  our  part  to  help  them  move  closer  to  international  
organisations” (ibid p.15).  As a global power, China must adapt to the international rules-based 
system. Furthermore, a strong Chinese position is not a zero-sum game: “if we position ourselves  
well and play a sensible political role, China’s ascending will not come at our expense, but rather  
will clearly benefit us” (Foreign Federal Office 2011c). 
19Original quote: “La relation UE-Chine est à cet égard un complément indispensable de la relation entre Paris et  
Pékin et un élément important de la politique chinoise de la France.”
23
What are the economic goals in trade with China?
Economic cooperation with China  is  already flourishing but  Germany wants  further  expansion. 
Reciprocal investment should be encouraged and the government will try to facilitate for German 
companies  to  enter  the  Chinese  market  (CDU/CSU 2007  p.13).  Securing  fair  competition  and 
abolishing the trade imbalance are key issues (ibid p.13). German companies must become and stay 
competitive to tackle the Chinese challenge, strengthening their quality and innovativeness (ibid 
p.12). Furthermore, promoting trade is a foreign policy objective seeing as trade plays a significant 
role in globalising German values (Westerwelle 2010 p.5). Economic goals are intertwined with 
political  ones  and  Germany  uses  its  economic  position  to  influence  China  on  political  issues 
(Foreign Federal Office 2010). This concept is by the government called 'change through trade' 
(Foreign Federal Office 2011c). 
What issues are on the agenda in trade with China?
Market  access:  Since “German commerce  relies on a fair  policy  environment  for international  
competition on the Chinese market” and is heavily relying on exports, opening-up of the Chinese 
market  is  a  prioritised  issue  (Glos  2006  p.3).  Entering  the  Chinese  market  must  mean  equal  
treatment for both foreign and domestic companies,  “it is important that EU enterprises making  
products  and  paying  taxes  in  China  receive  the  same  legal  treatment  as  Chinese  companies.  
Chinese companies enjoy equal treatment in the EU” (Westerwelle 2010 p.3).
IPR: IPR enforcement is of central importance (CDU/CSU 2007 p.13). One of the major challenges 
from Asia's rise is “inadequate protection of intellectual property rights and the pressure on foreign  
companies to share technology, particularly in relation to China” (ibid p.9). As a result of the huge 
investments made by German and European companies in China, the unprecedented transfer of 
technology and knowledge to the benefit of China is worrying (ibid p.10).  
Trade  balance:  Germany's  “trade  account  has  become  imbalanced:  Imports  from  China  are  
continuing to expand much faster than German exports to China” (Glos 2006 p.3). Trade balance is 
linked to the question of market access and fair rules. German firms have played a vital part in  
technology transfer to China and are willing to remain so on an open market with fair conditions 
and equal treatment (ibid p.3). The Chinese market must become safer and more transparent for 
foreign companies. 
24
Currency exchange rates: Germany wants China to regulate its exchange rate so that it properly 
reflects the strength of China's economy, leading to a fairer competition for German business (ibid 
p.3). “It is in the interests of both the country itself and its partners in trade that the exchange rate  
properly reflects the strength of a country’s economy.” (Westerwelle 2010 p.3). Revaluing the yuan 
would help to rectify the economic balance (CDU/CSU 2007 p.13). 
What is the preference of openness in trade with China? 
“No  country  is  as  dependent  on  international  trade  as  Germany”,  thus  open  trade  is  crucial 
(Foreign  Federal  Office  2011c).  Westerwelle  claims  that  China  and  Germany  both  are  export 
nations  depending on open  markets  and  free  trade  so  ”China  would  act  in  its  own  economic  
interests  if  China  reconsidered  its  decisions  on  export  restrictions.”  (Westerwelle  2010  p.2). 
Accordingly, Germany promotes free trade and urges China to reconsider its export restrictions to 
achieve a more open trading climate. “The world economy benefits from open markets, in Europe,  
in Asia, and elsewhere. That is why I strongly support all efforts to conclude free trade agreements  
between the EU and partners in Asia./.../Competitiveness must not be penalized, but encouraged” 
continues Westerwelle (ibid p.2). Foreign investment and trade are drivers of Germany's economy 
so their preference in trade with China is liberal. 
What should be the main tool in foreign trade policy with Ch  ina? 
Since 2004, the strategic dialogue is the main tool in foreign policy with China (Foreign Federal  
Office 2011b). Intergovernmental consultations introduced in 2010 has further intensified  bilateral 
relations (ibid). Germany must also work in coordination with the EU, US and partners in Asia to 
achieve a successful strategy for China (CDU/CSU 2007 p.11). “For this the EU needs to speak  
“with one voice” to China and Asia and must not allow itself to become divided” (Ibid p.16). The 
importance  of  unity  in  the  EU  approach  is  emphasised.  Protectionist  tools  should  be  used 
restrictively since using these “would be to decouple ourselves from Asia’s growing dynamism and  
usher in our own economic and political decline” (ibid p.11). Dialogue and cooperation should be 
the  major  tools  and trade  defence used  only  when justified.  WTO regulation  shall  ensure  fair 
competition in trade (ibid p.13). 
  
4.2.4 Poland  
Is China a prioritised economic partner? 
Poland has  lately been focusing  more on economic  partnerships  with  emerging countries,  with 
China being one of the priorities in Asia. “Polish authorities make all the possible efforts to attract  
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the country's  attention to business opportunities  offered by the country and to foster economic  
relations  with  the  new  world  powerhouse”,  according  to  the  Polish  Information  and  Foreign 
Investment Agency (PalilZ) (PalilZ 2011b). Poland has made several efforts to increase Chinese 
investment in Poland and China is perceived as a key investment source (PalilZ 2011a). Hence, the 
Polish are increasingly turning their attention to China. In addition, Prime Minister Donald Tusk has  
stated that well-founded economic and political relations with China is a key to success of every 
state (Polish Chancellery of the Prime Minister 2008). 
What is the opinion on China's role in international trade and economy? 
Foreign affairs minister Radosław Sikorski has in a speech on a conference about EU-US-China 
relations said that “The United States, European Union and China are not equal partners. In many  
areas their interests are convergent, but in many others – they are diverse or even conflicting.” 
(Sikorski 2008 p.1). China is becoming a leading global power and constitutes a challenge to both 
the US and the EU (ibid p.1). As “primarily an economic and trading partner”, China plays an 
essential role in global trade and economy (ibid p.1). China is seen as both a chance and a challenge 
(ibid p.3). With a stronger global influence, China must carry greater moral responsibility on the 
international arena  (ibid p.6).
What are the economic goals in trade with China?
Poland  believes  that  the  economic  relationship  with  China  has  large  potential  and  must  be 
strengthened and developed further. “We want to develop trade and business contacts with Asian  
countries in many sectors: infrastructure, finance, tourism and high-technologies” (Sikorski 2011 
p.12). A clear goal is increasing Chinese investments in Poland. Rafał Baniak, Under Secretary of 
State of the Ministry of Economy, declared that “Attracting foreign investment is a top priority of  
the Polish government’s  economic policy” (KPMG 2011 p.5).  Chinese investment  equals about 
0,1% of the FDI and has only a symbolic meaning, however, “since 2007 Chinese companies have  
been showing increased interest in launching investment projects in Poland. We hope that in the  
not-too-distant future this tendency will  bring  substantial results” (ibid p.5). In the Strategy for 
Promotion of the Polish Economy 2007-2015, a large part  of the budget is aimed at  promoting 
Poland on Asian markets (PalilZ 2007). 
What issues are on the agenda in trade with China?
Trade balance: “The import of Chinese goods to Poland is ten times as great as the export of Polish  
goods to China./.../We will attempt to establish this trading exchange on a more equal footing and  
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to encourage the development of Polish exporters” stated the former minister of economy  (ibid). 
“The biggest challenge for Polish policies vis-à-vis China is to achieve a trade balance” vice Prime 
Minister Waldemar Pawlak similarly claimed (Polish Market 2008 p.1). Reducing the Polish deficit 
and creating trade balance is vital. 
Increase Chinese investment in Poland: Boosting Chinese investment in the country is one of the 
main economic goals. Attracting FDI is priority and Poland has in recent years made efforts to 
attract  Chinese  investments  (KPMG  2011  p.5).  “Faced  by  fierce  competition  from the  highly  
developed countries,  Polish exporters are having problems reaching Chinese partners” remarks 
Pawlak (Polish Market 2008 p.1). Consequently, part of the economic strategy is promoting Poland 
for foreign investors.  Poland promotes itself as a bridge to the European market, believing it can 
play an essential role in creating cooperation networks between China and the EU (PalilZ 2010).
What is the preference of openness in trade with China? 
One of the Polish presidency's priorities on the 2nd half of 2011 was to emphasise openness (Polish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2011 p.5). However, Poland is known to be on the protectionist side in 
trade policy-making. Nevertheless, a joint strategic partnership declaration was signed in December 
2011,  stating  that  Poland wants  to  increase  economic  cooperation,  facilitate  for  Chinese  to  do 
business in Poland and hopes that the EU soon will grant China MES (Chinese Embassy in Poland 
2011). It promotes extended bilateral trade and investment and opposes trade protectionism (ibid). 
The declaration implies a more proactive approach on trade policy, where Poland seems to have 
shifted towards a more liberal stance in trade openness. A change in governing party in 2007 has 
indeed meant a move towards more liberal politics (The Economist 2011). However, the fact that 
Poland recently held the EU presidency might have an impact, making them conform more to the 
liberal EU position in trade.
What should be the main tool in foreign trade policy with Ch  ina? 
Poland  affirms  that  the  US-EU partnership  is  needed  to  tackle  the  economic  might  of  China 
(Sikorski 2008 p.6), confirming its strategy of acting in concert with European countries (Palonka 
2010 p.375). Bearing in mind the disproportion in capacity and size between China and Poland, 
acting together with more powerful players is a way for Poland to obtain influence in trade policy  
matters (ibid, p.375). Still, the strategic partnership with China shows that Poland is also aiming for  
a more independent approach. The partnership declaration calls for enhanced cooperation in many 
field and the establishment of a strategic dialogue mechanism (Chinese Embassy in Poland 2011). It 
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is hard to find clear views on the use of protectionist measures. However, the declaration opposes 
trade defence, and given that Poland seems to have become more open in trade, it is fair to assume 
that trade defence is not a prioritised policy tool. 
4.2.5 Sweden 
Is China a prioritised economic partner? 
China is Sweden's largest trading partner in Asia. There is a strong political and economic bilateral 
relation, with a considerable amount of Swedish FDI and business presence in China. In 2010, one 
third of the total exports to Asia had China as destination and China was the second biggest market 
after Germany for environmental technology exports (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2011). 
Deepening the economic relationship and increasing bilateral trade is important with the minister 
for trade, Ewa Björling, saying that “it is important that Swedish companies do not lag behind when  
it comes to setting up business in this dynamic part of the world” (Björling 2008a p.2). A deeper 
dialogue with China on a number of issues of the global agenda is needed, not least on economic 
ones (Bildt 2009 p.2). 
What is the opinion on China's role in international trade economy? 
China's exports are moving up the global supply chain and its role in international trade is and will 
become even more essential.  Accordingly, “China needs to take a more active role in the WTO  
negotiations and be a responsible stakeholder” which will lead to long-term economic benefits for 
both Chinese citizens and companies (Björling 2008a p.2).  “As a growing supplier of the world's  
exports, with a massive consumer market and as an important global investor, China has a major  
role to play in shaping globalisation./.../For governments, as well as for business, there are many  
new challenges involved, such as environmental impact, corruption or core labour standards” (ibid 
p.2).  China and the EU must cooperate in making “our common commitment to an open global  
economy and our common effort to create a more sustainable globalisation for the years ahead” 
states foreign minister Carl Bildt (Bildt 2009 p.2).  Sweden wants China to do its part in being a 
responsible and open player. 
What are the economic goals in trade with China?
Sweden wants to expand bilateral trade and investment and welcomes increased Chinese exports as 
well as more Swedish exports to China (Björling 2008a p.1). Sweden has a competitive advantage 
in  environmentally  friendly  and  sustainable  technology  and  China  has  a  need  for  sustainable 
solutions so Sweden is hoping for trade in this sector to expand (Swedish Government 2009 p.2).  
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Sustainable development and CSR in the economic relationship shall be enhanced. “For Sweden,  
promotion  of  corporate  social  responsibility  is  an  important  link  between  two cornerstones  of  
Swedish policy: an open trade policy and a foreign and development policy that strongly emphasise  
the  importance  of  human  rights  and  sustainable  global  development”  (Björling  2008b  p.1). 
Openness and sustainable development should be the foundations. 
What issues are on the agenda in trade with China?
CSR: Responsible business practices are seen as “a complementary tool for open and free trade,  
international investments, economic growth and sustainable development” (ibid p.1). The Swedish 
government has worked actively with promoting CSR in business and trade with China (Swedish 
Embassy 2011). Enhancing and strengthening co-operation with China in CSR is important to the 
government (Björling 2008a p.2). Consequently, Sweden gives CSR much attention.
Sustainable  development  and  environmental  issues:  Sweden  has  a  leading  position  in  green 
technology so they want to offer sustainable solutions to China, contributing with technology as 
well as institutional experience (ibid p.2). Swedish exports of green technology are promoted on the 
Chinese  market  (Swedish  Government  2009  p.2f).  “There  are  clear  linkages  between  trade,  
development, and the climate” (Björling 2011 p.1). These aspects are often brought forward in the 
economic dialogue.
IPR: Strengthening the protection of IPR is central.  “We have a particular interest in fostering a  
better protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights” (Björling 2008a p.1). Both foreign 
and Chinese companies  are hurt by IPR violations, therefore Sweden concurs with the common 
position and believes that China must take further steps to protect IPR (Tolgfors 2007 p.1). 
Openness: “Sweden is strongly committed to the principles of free and fair trade and values. Fair  
access  to  markets  is  a  crucial  dimension of  the  international  system”  declares  Prime  Minister 
Fredrik Reinfeldt (Reinfeldt 2008 p.2). Open trade and open markets are prioritised issues. “We are  
concerned about burdensome export and import procedures and the failure to open up government  
procurement and address non-tariff barriers” (Björling  2008a p.1). Access to a more transparent 
market must be improved, allowing Swedish and European companies to compete with Chinese 
enterprises on equal conditions (Björling 2010 p.8).
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What is the preference of openness in trade with China? 
The Swedish economy is export-driven, therefore,  Sweden strongly promotes open trade. “Free 
trade is a cornerstone of Swedish foreign and business policy./.../Swedish prosperity is built on  
international trade and the ability of our companies to compete in markets all over the world. One  
of Sweden's most important tasks in the EU is to be a strong defender of free trade” (ibid p.1). “We 
(China and the EU) should – in all international fora in the weeks and months to come – form a  
front against the protectionist temptations that we are now starting to see influencing policy” says 
Bildt and claims that open trade will be beneficial for both China and the EU (Bildt 2009 p.2). In 
addition,  greater  openness  and  the  elimination  of  trade  barriers  are  solutions  to  the  existing 
imbalance in EU-Sino trade (Tolgfors 2007 p.1).
What should be the main tool in foreign trade policy with Ch  ina? 
The  WTO is  a  cornerstone  in  international  trade,  and  is  perceived  as  “a  guardian  against  
protectionism” (Björling 2011 p.1).  To achieve open trade, the WTO regulations are essential. On 
the recent success of the GPA, Björling has said that “I hope China and others will shortly accede  
to the GPA in a truly ambitious manner” (ibid p.1). Furthermore, the CCP is a strength and Sweden 
will promote the elimination of trade barriers in EU trade policy with China (Björling 2008a p.1). 
Both Swedish and Chinese companies lose from trade defence and will benefit mutually from a 
removal of trade hindrances. Sweden therefore opposes the use of protectionist instruments in trade 
with China. Moreover, dialogue and joint co-operation with Chinese partners is and should be a key 
driver in the bilateral relationship (Swedish Ministry For Foreign Affairs 2009 p.5). The strategic 
dialogue between the EU and China must be deepened and developed further (Bildt 2009 p.2). 
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5. ANALYSIS       
Table  5.1  gives  an  overview  of  the  empirical  findings,  showing  a  variety  in  opinions  and 
preferences of member states in EU trade policy-making. 
Table 5.1 Summary of empirical findings.
 EU France Germany Poland Sweden 
Is China a 
prioritised 
economic 
partner? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes (more 
prioritised 
recently)
Yes 
What is the 
opinion on 
China's role  
in  
international  
trade and 
economy?
China is a 
chance and a 
challenge.
China must 
promote 
economic 
openness. 
China is a 
partner and a 
competitor. 
China must 
carry 
responsibilities
China must 
carry 
responsibilities. 
China is a 
chance. 
China is a 
chance and a 
challenge.
China must 
carry 
responsibilities.
China must 
carry 
responsibilities. 
China must 
promote 
economic 
openness.
What are the  
economic 
goals in  
trade with  
China? 
Strengthen 
economic 
relations. 
Mutual 
benefits.
Strengthen 
economic 
relations. 
Reciprocity. 
Mutual 
benefits.  
Strengthen 
economic 
relations. 
'Change 
through trade'.
Develop and 
strengthen 
economic 
relations. 
Strengthen 
economic 
relations. 
Sustainable 
development, 
CSR.
What issues 
are on the 
agenda in  
trade with  
China?
Market access.
MES.
Trade balance.
IPR.
Public 
Procurement. 
Trade balance. 
IPR. 
Currency 
exchange rate. 
Market access.
IPR. 
Trade balance.
Currency 
exchange rate.  
Trade balance.
Increase 
Chinese 
investment in 
Poland.  
CSR.
Sustainable 
development, 
environmental 
issues. 
IPR. 
Openness. 
What is the 
preference on 
openness in  
trade with  
China? 
Openness is 
crucial.
Openness 
should be 
reciprocal. 
Openness is 
supported but 
must be 
reciprocal. 
Openness is 
crucial.
China should 
reconsider 
trade 
restrictions.
Openness is 
supported 
(shifting 
towards a more 
liberal stance).  
Openness is 
crucial.
Eliminate trade 
barriers. 
What should 
be the main 
tool used in  
foreign trade  
policy with  
China? 
Dialogue and 
negotiation. 
Trade defence 
is a secondary 
solution.
Strategic 
dialogue.
The EU. 
Strategic 
dialogue.
EU's 'one 
voice'.
Restrictive use 
of trade 
defence.
The EU. 
Strategic 
partnership. 
Restrictive use 
of trade 
defence.
The EU and the 
WTO.
Opposes trade 
defence. 
Dialogue, joint 
cooperation.
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The member states all  see China as an important  economic partner and want  to strengthen the 
bilateral economic relationship. In the Polish case it is also about developing the bilateral relations 
which are currently the least developed among the analysed countries. There is consensus on the 
fact  that,  due to  China's  increased  power  and influence  on the  global  arena,  China  must  carry 
greater responsibilities and be a responsible stakeholder. They all mention the EU as an important 
tool  in trade policy.  Dialogue is  also essential  where all  member states except  for Sweden has 
strategic partnerships with China. They all support openness in trade. On protectionism, Sweden, 
Germany and Poland explicitly state that they oppose trade defence.  No explicit statement was 
found for France on the matter. 
5.1 Prioritised issues 
Empiricism show that the fundamental issues in trade policy with China are the same. Rectifying 
the trade imbalance is  vital  to all.  The trade deficit  worries the  EU as well  as  member states. 
However, the Commission often raises more underlying and systemic questions such as rebalancing 
trade, creating a level-playing field through better market access and the question of MES. While 
some member states similarly emphasise these questions, they also tend to raise certain issues that  
concern national interests more specifically. 
Germany, France and Sweden highlight IPR. Germany and Sweden are competitive in advanced 
industrial sectors while France is an essential exporter of luxury brands. Naturally, IPR are relevant 
to these economies that have high-tech and high-value added exports. They lose competitiveness 
when intellectual property is not protected in China. For Poland, IPR is not equally important since 
its economy has less competitive advantage in this field. Instead, the Polish promotes increased 
Chinese investment in Poland. For other member states it is rather the other way around. France, 
Germany and Sweden want their companies to expand in China, increasing foreign investment in 
China and cooperation with Chinese partners. Increasing their presence in China would be a way to 
deal with the bilateral economic imbalance. Poland also has a big deficit. They hope that increased 
Chinese  investment  in  Poland  will  lead  to  greater  economic  exchange  which  can  rebalance 
economic relations. 
Germany  and  France  raise  the  issue  of  the  yuan's  exchange  rate  that  creates  artificial 
competitiveness for Chinese exports. Since Poland and Sweden do not have the euro they are less 
concerned by this since currency adjustment is more flexible. Germany and France also mention 
environmental and sustainable aspects in trade policy but do not give as much priority to these 
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questions as Sweden does. Sweden is known to promote sustainable development and is also a 
leader in green technology. Thus, it is not surprising that the Swedish frequently raise CSR, climate 
change and other sustainable aspects in trade with China. 
5.2 Openness and trade defence 
The common position is that openness is a key in trade with China. The EU opposes protectionism 
although the openness should be reciprocal.  The member states all  claim to support the liberal 
stance but put different weight on open trade which indicate that some are more liberal than others. 
It is hard to find an explicit French statement on the use of trade defence albeit extensive research.  
For Germany, Sweden and Poland, official statements on the matter exist. Nevertheless, it must be 
remembered  that  the  texts  and  addresses  analysed  have  been  the  official,  explicit  opinion  of 
governments. This means that the actual preference might not always shine through so it is hard to 
draw  conclusions  with  absolute  certainty.  With  more  time,  preferences  in  openness  could  be 
examined further through studying WTO cases, looking at what stances individual member states 
take in trade disputes with China. However, looking at the issues raised and bearing in mind earlier 
research in similar fields, the official trade policy preference gives important indications of the 'true' 
opinion. The conclusions drawn therefore have validity but the fact that rhetorics not always to 
100% depict the actual preference is important to keep in mind. 
With the Commission's preference in trade as a reference point, previous studies claim France and 
Poland to be more protectionist while Sweden and Germany have a preference more similar to the  
common position, being on the liberal side. Openness is key in EU's competitiveness strategy and 
the Commission believes that the use of trade defence should always be the second solution. In 
Sweden's case, the liberal view can clearly be confirmed in national policy and for Germany this is 
also affirmed. Both countries regularly declare that openness in trade is crucial. Germany is claimed 
to have become more restrictive in trade policy with China when shifting to Merkel's rule (Fox et al. 
2009 p.4f). Although this study only incorporated documents from Merkel's time in office so such a 
change might be hard to identify, tendencies for a more protectionist preference that still might have 
been expected  can not  be  confirmed.  However,  there  is  much at  stake  in  trade  with  China  so 
officially taking a more restrictive stance could do serious harm to Germany's economic relations. 
A  more  protectionist  attitude  can  be  interpreted  for  France  when  it  specifically  underlines 
'reciprocity' and demands openness from China in return, thus obtaining a tougher stance. The EU 
also  talk  about  reciprocity  yet  France's  emphasis  is  stronger  and  more  consistent.  The  Polish 
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preference is less protectionist than might be expected with regard to earlier studies. The Polish-
Sino strategic partnership declares opposition to trade defence. The recently held EU presidency, a 
change to a more liberal governing party and the recession raising a need for business deals and 
investment (Godement et al. 2011 p.7) might have affected their stance.
Conclusions from what has not been stated can be drawn through reading between the lines. Even if 
a member state has a less liberal preference than the common one, it  is nothing that would be 
emphasised in the official approach since this might hurt relations with China as well as EU's 'single  
voice'. Therefore, the fact that trade defence in France's cases is not explicitly opposed can motivate 
that the French are more protectionist than Germany or Sweden. France's tone is more restrictive.  
Furthermore,  France,  Poland  and  the  EU  all  mention  that  China  is  an  opportunity  yet  also  a 
competitor, pointing towards a more protectionist attitude in trade than Germany's or Sweden's. 
5.3 Linking back to the theoretical framework 
The priorities of member states demonstrate that trade policy preferences are driven by national 
interests. In line with rational choice theory, countries make rational choices and highlight issues 
that will benefit them. In this case it has mostly concerned maximising economic gains and profits 
from the commercial relationship. This can be illustrated by Germany who emphasises increased 
market  access  for  European  companies  while  Poland  wants  to  see  increased  Chinese  business 
presence  in  Poland.  Germany's  economic  relationship  with  China  is  very  export-driven,  better 
market access will clearly benefit their economy. Since Poland's exports to China are of a much 
smaller scale the economic gains from increased access to the market are smaller for them. 
Furthermore, the issues prioritised and the questions discussed seem to be a result of the tension 
between  collective  and  individual  interests  that  IPE  argues  for.  Here,  the  state  represents 
collectivity.  Consumers,  exporters,  enterprises  and lobby  groups  make  up for  private  interests. 
Sweden  has  an  extensive  green  lobby  plus  a  government  with  an  awareness  of  sustainable 
development which can explain why Sweden underlines sustainable business practices. In Germany, 
media coverage and public opinion on trade relations with China are quite critical (Fox et al. 2009 
p.68).  Unsurprisingly,  the German government also talk about  'change through trade',  a way of 
affecting political issues through the economic relationship. This can be a way for the government 
to legitimate the intensive trade relationship with China. Trade as a tool in foreign policy that IPE 
incorporates can be applied on the German approach. 
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When choosing member states, the countries were selected to obtain variation in several factors. 
Assuring a variation in these does not equal a theory testing approach with the aim of testing the 
factors  specifically.  Still,  it  is  interesting  to  discuss  if  certain  factors  might  have  affected  the 
preferences. The North-South divide, with 'North' (Sweden, Germany) being more open and 'South' 
(France, Poland) more closed in trade can be somewhat confirmed. For the liberal camp, the result 
concurs with findings from previous studies. In the French and Polish case the preferences are less 
clear but from the discussion a more protectionist  preference in France's case can be identified 
whereas Poland is not as liberal as Germany or Sweden but still more liberal than expected. With 
regards  to  the  demand  for  reciprocity  and  China  perceived  as  a  competitor,  the  common  EU 
position was found to be more protectionist than anticipated. However, it has been pointed out that  
EU's tone towards China indeed has become more restrictive in trade during the last few years 
(Dreyer et al. 2009 p.8), corroborating with the empirical findings. 
The countries also differ in economic strength, interpreted as size of the economy. Sweden and 
Poland are small economies while Germany and France are large. From the results, there seem to be 
no obvious correspondence between the economic strength of a country and national opinions on 
trade  policy  neither  in  priorities  nor  liberalisation  level.  However,  if  economic  strength  was 
interpreted differently, empiricism might have led to a different conclusion. 
Instead of  size of the national economy, what matters more seem to be the  specialisation of the 
economy.  Sweden and Germany specialise  more  in  value  added production and services  while 
China is a big manufacturer and assembler in the production process (IDE-JETRO, WTO 2011 
p.87). Hence, open trade for Sweden or Germany with China is beneficial since they in many cases 
complement each other in global product networks (GPN). However, China is moving up the value 
chain, leading to increasing competition from Chinese exporters too in these countries. A possible 
explanation for a more protectionist preference of the Polish and French can be linked to the type of 
role they have in GPN's, having businesses with comparative disadvantages to China which leads to 
a less open trade preference. 
For IPE scholars,  the WTO statement  that countries with strong export growth use less import 
protection than countries with declining exports, is relevant (Balaam et al p.134). France's exports 
to GDP ratio is the lowest among the four member states. The other three nations have strong ratios 
with both Sweden and Germany obtaining trade surpluses. As stated earlier, this thesis does not aim 
to test how the variating factors might affect national preferences. However, that trade intensity 
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matter as a factor in trade policy preference seems to be strengthened by the empirical findings and 
is therefore a result worth highlighting. More export-driven countries, in this study Sweden and 
Germany, are less prone to use trade defence since they are more dependent on trade. Poland also 
has a high export to GDP ratio but are still less liberal in EU-Sino trade than these two. In the Polish  
case one must remember that they have little economic exchange with China.  The conclusion? 
Trade intensity on a general level might matter for trade policy preferences. Trade intensity with the 
trading partner in question does matter for trade policy preferences, where a higher level of bilateral 
trade intensity seems to lead to a more open preference in trade. 
5.4 Conclusion   
There is common position in trade, but is there a common preference? The empirical findings show 
a difference between the common preference and national preferences, confirming a division among 
member states in trade policy with China. Even though the most important issues such as trade 
balance and market access are consistent, member states prioritise a variety of issues that differ 
from the common position. Moreover, they do not have the same preference in openness as the EU. 
However, the fact that there is a common external policy is not ignored and member states are 
aware of the existing framework to act within. Member states do not always agree with the common 
preference on trade defence but they do not openly act against it.
If earlier research on internal divisions in trade policy-making are taken into account, there was less 
variety  in  national  preferences  than  anticipated.  Official  language  plays  its  part  here.  Formal 
documents  and  statements  keep  a  diplomatic  tone.  What  preferences  member  states  actually 
transmit to the TPC or discuss during bilateral meetings with China might not show. The fact that 
policy making is divided but not very evident in the official preference is also an interesting result,  
indicating  that  much  of  the  division  will  be  seen  clearer  when  studying  the  TPC  or  closed 
negotiations. Explicit statements on trade defence for France were missing, probably due to the 
formal nature of the documents analysed. Interpretative work had to be conducted leading to some 
uncertainty in the concerned conclusion, although the interpretation is motivated so the conclusion 
is still estimated as justified. 
However, this thesis is limited to examine not the policy-making process but the policy output. This 
means analysing official opinions and priorities, giving the study validity. Also, it was limited to 
include the common position and four member states only. However, the countries were selected to 
maximise  variation  in  order  to  be  more  representative  for  EU27  as  a  whole.  Limitations  are 
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necessary yet might affect the empirical results. Further studies that include a greater variety of 
member states would give a more complete picture of the problem at hand. Other types of analysis 
material such as personal interviews with officials would be complementary, securing more easily 
comparable material with less need to worry about the actual preference not being demonstrated. 
Foreign investment turned out to be an important factor in EU-Sino trade policy. Thus, studies that 
also put  investment  in  focus would be  beneficial  to  get  a  more  thorough understanding of the 
preferences. Taking it to the next level would be to focus on the process in trade policy-making such 
as what is happening behind closed doors in the TPC. 
In  conclusion,  this  thesis  shows  how national  approaches  in  trade  relations  differ.  Although 
explaining  why they differ  was not  the main objective,  empiricism points to  trade dependency, 
comparative advantages or disadvantages with the trading partner and domestic forces as influential 
factors. On a more theoretical note, global network theory sets the broader framework, explaining 
the background and conditions of international trade to which the countries and the EU must adapt. 
Rational  choice  theory  and  IPE  are  also  strengthened  since  they  help  to  explain  individual 
approaches and preferences of member states and of the EU. 
This study has demonstrated that member states prioritise different issues in trade with China and 
that they have diverging opinions on the level of openness in trade. Differing national preferences 
contribute to explaining why developing a coherent and supranational trade policy is difficult for 
the EU. The disunity in official approaches and rhetorics complicates the Commission's mandate as 
a  representative  of  the  common  voice.  Hence,  it  becomes  difficult  for  the  EU  to  convert  its 
economic strength into influence, to negotiate more favourable trade conditions and better market 
access in order to improve economic balance with China. The result resembles a vicious circle. As 
long as the trade deficit is not reduced and national trade data still look gloomy, member states will 
continue to act rationally and individually, raising issues that are in their national interests in order 
to maximise economic gains. If the common position is not followed by a common preference, 
difficulties  in  developing  a  coherent  EU trade  policy  with  China  will  persist,  making tangible 
results harder to obtain. 
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6. SUMMARY  
China is one of the EU's most important trading partners, constituting a considerable opportunity 
and challenge for Europe. The EU-Sino trade relationship is essential. However, it has been hard for 
member states to reach a common position and interest in the common trade policy for China and 
thus for the EU to develop a coherent and effective trade policy. This study examines how national 
preferences  in  EU trade  policy  with  China  differ  from each  other  and  from the  common EU 
preference. The aim is to contribute to a deeper comprehension of the issues and difficulties that 
exist  in  EU-Sino trade  policy-making and  to  make a  contribution  to  the  theoretical  debate  on 
supranational vs. national decision-making within the EU. 
The theoretical framework contributes to an understanding of the bilateral economic relations with 
China and of the individual national preferences. The emphasis lies on modern trade theory such as 
global network theory and IPE. However, rational choice and more traditional trade theory is also 
incorporated and their relevance should not be ignored. 
The study has been limited to look at the preferences of EU and of four member states specifically: 
France, Germany, Poland and Sweden. A qualitative analysis of texts has been conducted through a 
comparison of relevant documents. By analysing the policy texts and official statements of these 
four countries and of the EU, it explores how official preferences in EU-Sino trade policy differ. 
The study confirms a division among member states in trade policy preference with China. National 
preferences diverge from the common preference. It demonstrates diversity in what issues member 
states prioritise and what level of openness in trade member states prefer. The Swedish, the German 
and the EU position are on the liberal side in trade policy for China. France and Poland are more 
protectionist than they are. However, the preference of Poland, and to some extent Germany, was 
more liberal than expected. 
How national approaches in common trade policy differ is shown in explicit terms for four member 
states. Although the main objective is not to explain why they do, the empirical findings point to 
trade intensity,  comparative  advantages  or  disadvantages  with the  trading partner and domestic 
forces  as  important  factors.  National  interests  are  driving forces.  The incorporated theories  are 
strengthened, with global network theory explaining the conditions for international trade and IPE 
and rational choice arguments being relevant for why preferences in trade policy diverge.
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6. SAMMANFATTNING (Summary in Swedish) 
Kina är en av EU's viktigaste handelspartners och utgör en avsevärd möjlighet och utmaning för 
Europa. Handelsrelationen mellan EU och Kina är essentiell. Dock har medlemsstaterna haft svårt 
att verka för en gemensam position och ett gemensamt intresse i handelspolitiken med Kina och 
därmed även för EU att utveckla en sammanhängande och effektiv handelspolitik. Denna studie 
undersöker hur nationella preferenser för EU's handelspolitik med Kina skiljer sig från varandra och 
från den gemensamma positionen. Studiens syfte är att ge en djupare förståelse för de ämnen och 
svårigheter som existerar inom handelspolitik mellan EU och Kina och att bidra till den teoretiska 
debatten om överstatligt kontra nationellt beslutsfattande inom EU.
Det teoretiska ramverket bidrar till en förståelse för de bilaterala ekonomiska relationerna med Kina 
och till att förklara individuella nationella preferenser. Tyngdpunkten ligger på modern handelsteori 
såsom  global  nätverksteori  och  IPE.  Emellertid  är  även  rational  choice  och  mer  traditionell 
handelsteori också med och deras betydelse bör inte förbises. 
Studien är begränsad till att titta på preferenserna för EU och för fyra specifika medlemsländer: 
Frankrike,  Tyskland,  Polen  och  Sverige.  En  kvalitativ  textanalys  har  genomförts  genom  en 
jämförelse mellan relevanta dokument. Genom att analysera EU:s och dessa fyra länders policy-
texter  och officiella  uttalanden undersöker  uppsatsen hur officiella  preferenser  skiljer  sig  åt  för 
handelspolitik mellan Kina och EU. 
En  division  mellan  medlemsstater  i  handelspolitik  med  Kina  bekräftas  av  studien.  Nationella 
preferenser  skiljer  sig  från  den  gemensamma.  Resultaten  visar  på  olikhet  i  de  frågor 
medlemsländerna prioriterar och den nivå av öppenhet i handeln som föredras. Sverige, Tyskland 
och EU är liberalt  lagda i  sin handelspolitiska hållning med Kina.  Frankrike och Polen är mer 
protektionistiska. Dock visade sig Polen och i viss mån Tyskland sig vara liberalare än väntat. 
Denna  studie  demonstrerar  explicit  hur  nationella  förhållningssätt  i  den  gemensamma 
handelspolitiken skiljer sig åt för fyra medlemsstater. Även om studien inte huvudsakligen ämnar 
till att förklara varför de gör det, så pekar de empiriska resultaten på handelsintensitet, komparativa 
fördelar och nackdelar med handelspartnern och inhemska faktorer som viktiga element. Nationella 
intressen är drivande krafter. De teorier som tas upp är stärkta, där global nätverksteori förklarar 
grundförutsättningarna för internationell handel och där IPE och rational choice är relevanta för 
varför preferenser i handelspolitik ser olika ut. 
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